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 Abstract – SYN flooding attacks generate enormous packets 
by a large number of agents and can easily exhaust the 
computing and communication resources of a victim within a 
short period of time. In this paper, we propose a lightweight 
method for detecting SYN flooding attack by non-parametric 
cumulative sum algorithm. We experiment with real SYN 
flooding attack data set in order to evaluate our method. The 
results show that our method can detect SYN flooding attack 
very well. 
 
 Index Terms –  Cumulative sum algorithm; Dos; SYN 
flooding. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 Distributed denial of service(DDoS) attacks launched 
from a large number of compromised hosts, are a major threat 
to Internet services [1-2]. Popular web sites are among the 
well known victims of attacks, yet an even larger number of 
online companies than these depend on the stability and 
availability of the Internet and face considerable losses should 
they be the object of a DDoS attack [3-4]. 
 
Fig. 1 Normal TCP connection and half-open TCP connection. 
 In DDOS attacks, more than 90% of attacks exploit TCP. 
The most efficient and commonly-used SYN flooding attacks 
exploit the standard TCP three-way handshake in which the 
server receives a client’s SYN request, replies with a 
SYN/ACK packet and then waits for the client to send the 
ACK to complete the handshake. The normal behaviour of this 
process is summarized as follows. If Bod wants to connect to 
Alice then Bob initiates the connection by sending a SYN 
segment to Alice. Alice should reply with a SYN/ACK 
segment that acknowledges the initial SYN. The connection is 
established between the two endpoints when Alice returns an 
ACK to Bob, acknowledging the SYN–ACK as shown in the 
left of Fig. 1. While waiting for the final ACK, the server 
maintains a half-open connection. Since the SYN flooding 
attacker always chooses unreachable addresses as the spoofed 
source addresses of the attacking packets, the server will not 
receive the anticipated final ACK from the client as shown in 
the right of Fig. 1. As more and more half-open connections 
are maintained on a victim server, such SYN flooding attacks 
deplete the server’s resources and the server will as a result 
refuse services even to legitimate customer requests [5]. 
 At present, many attack detection and defense 
mechanisms to SYN flooding exist [4, 6-10] . Their goal is to 
detect, countermeasure, or prevent attacks.  
 In [6], the authors proposed a novel defense mechanism 
that makes use of the edge routers that are associated with the 
spoofed IP addresses’ networks to determine whether the 
incoming SYN–ACK segment is valid. This is accomplished 
by maintaining a matching table of the outgoing SYNs and 
incoming SYN–ACKs and also by using the ARP protocol. If 
an incoming SYN–ACK segment is not valid, the edge router 
resets the connection at the victim’s host, freeing up an entry 
in the victim’s backlog queue, and enabling it to accept other 
legitimate incoming connection requests. They also presented 
a communication protocol to encourage collaboration between 
various networks to protect each other. 
 In [7] , the authors seek to provide a method that detects 
SYN flooding attacks in a timely fashion and that responds 
accurately and independently on the victim side. They used 
the knowledge of network traffic delay distribution and apply 
an active probing technique (DARB) to identify half-open 
connections that, suspiciously, may not arise from normal 
network congestion. This method is suitable for large network 
areas and is capable of handling bursts of traffic flowing into a 
victim server. Accurate filtering is ensured by a counteraction 
method using IP address and time-to-live (TTL) fields. 
 In [8], the authors’ main motivation for doing so is 
network security: rapid anomaly detection for an early 
detection of attacks in computer networks that lead to changes 
in network traffic. Moreover, this kind of application 
encourages the development of a nonparametric multichannel 
detection test that does not use exact pre-change (legitimate) 
and post-change (attack) traffic models. The proposed 
nonparametric method can be effectively applied to detect a 
wide variety of attacks such as denial-of-service attacks, 
worm-based attacks, port-scanning, and man-in-the-middle 
attacks. In addition, they also proposed a multichannel 
procedure that is based on binary quantized data; this 
procedure turns out to be more efficient than the previous two 
algorithms in certain scenarios. 
 In this paper, we propose a lightweight SYN flooding 
attack detection method. In this method, we adopt non-
parametric cumulative sum algorithm to find attacks. We 
conduct the experiments to evaluate our proposed method. 
Experimental results show that our method can effectively 
detect TCP SYN flooding attacks 
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. 
Section II introduces our proposed method. Experiments are 
taken in Section III. Finally, Section IV is our conclusions. 
 
II.  OUR METHOD 
 Cumulative sum (CUSUM) algorithm is used in the 
quality control. They are well suited for checking a measuring 
system in operation for any departure from some target or 
specified values and have been widely used for detecting the 
small and moderate mean shifts [11-12]. 
 In this paper, we focuses on the use of  non-parametric 
CUSUM [12] to detect TCP SYN flooding attacks. In the 
context of detecting SYN flooding attacks, for each SYN 
packet, CUSUM monitors a set of n SYN packet sample 
interval  , ,1y yn . yn  is the sum of all SYN packets in n-th 
sample interval (detection interval). Assume that the change 
SYN traffic  iy  is independent Gaussian distribution with 
known variance 2  [13] , which we assume remains the same 
after the change, and 0  and 1  are the mean SYN traffic 
before and after the change.  
 Then CUSUM ( fn ) can be described as follows: 
                     (1) 
Of course the assumption of Gaussian distribution about  iy  
can be not true for TCP SYN packet measurements, due to 
weekly or daily variations, trends, and time correlations. Thus, 
such non-stationary behavior should be removed before 
applying CUSUM by the approach in [14]. In addition to 
leading to complex and time-consuming calculations, we 
consider a simple approach to apply CUSUM to xn , with 
1x xn n n                                                                   (2) 
where xn  is the sum of all SYN packets in the n-th sample 
interval, and n  is an estimate of the mean number of SYN 
packet at sample n, which is computed using an exponential 
weighted moving average (EWMA) as follows:  
(1 )1 xn n n                                                           (3) 
where   is the EWMA factor. The mean rating traffic of xn  
prior to a change is zero, hence the mean in (2) is 00  . A 
remaining issue that needs to be addressed is the value of 1 , 
i.e., the mean number of SYN packet after the change. This 
cannot be known beforehand, hence we approximate it with 
n , where   is amplitude percentage parameter, which 
corresponds to the most probable percentage of increase of the 
mean number of SYN packet after a change.  
 Then CUSUM from (1) can be written:   
                        (4) 
If f hn   ( 0h  is the predesigned CUSUM threshold 
parameter), then alarm.  
 
III.  PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
A. Experiments setup 
We carried out a simulation experiment to evaluate the 
performance of our proposed method. The performance 
consists of the detection ratio and false alarm ratio.  
In this experiment, we adopt a real TCP SYN flooding 
attacks dataset, i.e., DARPA dataset [15]. It is an off-line 
intrusion detection benchmark is used for the experiment. The 
DARPA data set represents Tcpdump and audit data generated 
over five weeks of simulated network traffic in a hypothetical 
military local area network (LAN).  The DARPA data set 
was the first in a planned series of annual evaluations 
conducted by MIT Lincoln Laboratory under DARPA 
sponsorship [1, 5]. These evaluations are designed to focus 
research efforts on core technical issues and provide unbiased 
measurement of current performance levels. The primary 
purpose of the evaluations is to drive iterative performance 
improvements in participating systems by revealing strengths 
and weaknesses and helping researchers focus on eliminating 
weaknesses. To insure that the greatest numbers of researchers 
can participate, common shared corpora are created that can 
be distributed and used by a wide range of researchers [16]. 
Such corpora simplify entrance into this field and make it 
possible to compare alternate approaches. To make sure the 
evaluation could uncover weaknesses in many types of 
intrusion detection systems, widely varied attacks were 
developed that span the types of attacks which might be used 
by both novice and highly skilled attackers. Efforts were also 
made to keep the evaluation simple and to encourage the 
widest participation possible by eliminating security and 
privacy concerns and providing data types used by the 
majority of intrusion detection systems. Simplicity and more 
widespread participation were obtained in the first 1998 
evaluation by focusing on UNIX hosts and outside attacks 
originating from remote hosts [15, 17]. 
 
B. Performance result on detection ratio 
Table I show the detection results with our proposed 
method. From the results, our proposed method is very 
effective. It can accurate detect TCP SYN flooding attacks 
with 98.82% detection ratio on average. For example, 
Although when the number of TCP SYN attack packet is 
smaller than 400, the detection ratio cannot reach to 100%, 
when  the number is bigger than 600, the detection ratio of our 
proposed method is 100%. This means that our proposed 
method is  effective. It can find the SYN flooding attack with 
high detection ratio. 
Moreover, in this paper, if we cannot consider the 
dynamic network environment, the experimental results of our 
proposed method indicate that our proposed method can 
almost find all TCP SYN flooding attacks. 
TABLE I 
DETECTION RATIO 
 
SYN packets/second Detection ratio 
200 95.9 % 
400 98.2 % 
600 100 % 
800 100 % 
1000 100 % 
 
C. Performance result on false alarm ratio 
From the  Table 2, our proposed approach is also very 
effective. Its false alarm ratio is very low on average. It only is 
2.46%. The false alarm ratio is so low that it almost is omitted 
in practical application. 
Furthermore, When the number of TCP SYN attack 
packet is bigger than 800, the false alarm ratio is 0%. This 
means that our proposed method accurately can find SYN 
flooding attacks. Although when  the number is smaller than 
600, the false alarm ratio of our proposed method isn’t 0%, it 
also is smaller that 10%. Moreover, in this paper, if we cannot 
consider the dynamic network environment, the experimental 
results of our proposed method indicate that our proposed 
method can almost find all TCP SYN flooding attacks. 
From Tables I and II, the experimental results indicate 
that our proposed method is  very effective. It accurately can 
find TCP SYN flooding attack with low false alarm ratio and high 
detection ratio.  
TABLE II 
FALSE ALARM RATIO 
 
SYN packets/second False alarm ratio 
200 7.4 % 
400 4.3 % 
600 0.6 % 
800 0 % 
1000 0 % 
 
IV.  CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 TCP SYN flooding attacks seriously threaten Internet 
services yet there is currently no defense against such attacks 
that provides both early detection, allowing time for 
counteraction, and an accurate response. Traditional detection 
methods rely on passively sniffing an attacking signature and 
are inaccurate in the early stages of an attack. Current 
counteractions such as traffic filter or rate-limit methods do 
not accurately distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate 
traffic and are difficult to deploy. This work seeks to provide a 
lightweight method that accurately can find SYN flooding 
attacks. In this paper, we apply non-parametric cumulative 
sum algorithm to detect SYN flooding attack. In order to 
evaluate our proposed method, we conducted experiment with 
a real TCP SYN flooding attack dataset. The experimental 
results shown that our proposed method is very effective. It 
accurately can find TCP SYN flooding attack with low false 
alarm ratio and high detection ratio.  
 Although our proposed method is very effective, there are 
some limitations in our method. For example, how to evaluate 
the detection time of our proposed method. Hence, in order to 
improve the performance of our method, it is our future 
research work. 
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